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In its recent decision in Medellin v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme 
Court had to decide whether the conviction of a murderer should be 
reopened in light of U.S. obligations under public international law.1  
After a Texan Court had found the petitioner, a Mexican citizen, 
guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) had decided that the Court had violated 
Medellin’s rights under the Vienna Convention to notify the Mexican 
Consulate, and ordered the United States “to provide, by means of its 
own choosing, review and reconsideration of the conviction[] and sen-
tence[].”2 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, denied Medellín’s ap-
peal to have his conviction reopened. 
Among the many fascinating aspects in the opinion, one concerns 
the effect of the ICJ decision. The Court refused Medellín’s conten-
tion that “giving the Avena judgment binding effect in domestic 
courts simply conforms to the proposition that domestic courts gener-
ally give effect to foreign judgments,”3 with the response that 
“Medellín does not ask us to enforce a foreign-court judgment set-
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tling a typical commercial or property dispute.”4 This must mean that 
there is, in the Court’s view, a crucial difference between the en-
forcement of a private law judgment (commercial or property), which 
is almost a matter of course, and a public law judgment, which re-
quires special justification. Further, the fact that no real argument fol-
lows suggests the difference must be so obvious that it needs no fur-
ther discussion; merely pointing it out seems enough. 
The difference is indeed normally viewed as obvious, but on 
closer thought it is anything but that.  After all, in domestic law, the 
public/private distinction is widely discarded. Legal realism taught us 
long ago that private law is “really” public law. Property and contract 
are not truly private institutions; they are expansions of state sover-
eignty, public powers vested in rightsholders to engage the state’s 
help in enforcing their interest. Private law performs public functions 
of the state, and it is administered by public institutions, namely the 
courts of the state. Many private law scholars will discuss their fields 
with public functions in mind: economic efficiency and social welfare 
maximization, deterrence of socially undesirable conduct, etc. 
Occasionally, similar claims that private and public are now 
merged are made in the international realm. By and large, however, 
the distinction between private and public international law still holds. 
In fact, public and private international lawyers rarely even talk to 
each other. Public international lawyers focus on the relations be-
tween sovereign states. When they look to private actors, their ques-
tion is whether these actors can be viewed as subjects of international 
law, not whether they threaten the essentially public character of pub-
lic international law altogether. When they speak about human rights, 
they think of public rights in the relation between states and individu-
als, not of private rights between individuals. Mostly, private transac-
tions are not an issue for public international law. Private interna-
tional lawyers, by contrast, are aware of the significant impact that 
public international law has on their field, especially through treaties 
and through doctrines like sovereign immunity, the act of state doc-
trine, and others. They are also concerned with the effect of human 
rights on private law. In fact, international conflict of laws is some-
times thought of as part of public international law. But traditionally, 
private international lawyers do not care much about those debates in 
public international law that have no immediate impact on their field. 
 
 4. Id. 
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International courts and customary international law seem irrelevant 
to them. 
The Duke Journal for International and Comparative Law thus 
chose a highly important and topical topic for its annual conference, 
from which the contributions to this issue are derived. In fact, when 
my colleague Curtis Bradley and I discussed the topic, we both agreed 
that the public/private distinction in the international realm was un-
dertheorized, although our own intuitions led us in opposite ways: 
Curt thought the private should be treated more like the public, I felt 
the public should be treated more like the private. At the same time, 
the conference was the result of a very fruitful cooperation between 
the journal and Duke’s Center for International and Comparative 
Law, where the Journal was involved in the programmatic planning 
and organization and the Center provided financial and institutional 
support. The result was a successful conference and an impressive 
journal issue. The debate between public and private international 
lawyers is so fruitful because it helps go beyond the superficial and 
somewhat trite insight that public and private international law over-
lap and mutually influence each other. Instead, I would argue, three 
big questions emerge. They run through all panels and almost all con-
tributions. 
The first question is an educational one: What can public and pri-
vate international law learn from each other? Where do parallel de-
bates in public and private international law exist that should be 
linked? To what extent are experiences made in one field fruitful for 
the other? 
We find this addressed in all panels. Take the question of the 
third panel: private arbitral decisions and international court judg-
ments. Decisions by arbitral tribunals are regularly enforced; deci-
sions of public international courts, by contrast, receive merely “re-
spectful consideration.” Is this consistent? Does it help to say one is 
private and the other public, given that U.S. courts will even enforce 
arbitral awards dealing with U.S. public international law (antitrust 
law)? Or take the question of the fourth panel: acceptance and en-
forcement of private and public international law. We regularly en-
force foreign private law through conflict of laws, but we hesitate with 
regard to foreign and international public law. Is this justified? Can 
the current discussion on the role of public international law in do-
mestic law learn from the debate in choice of law, seventy years old, 
on the role of foreign law in domestic proceedings? 
MICHAELS_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:23:05 PM 
256 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:253 
Perhaps the educational question becomes most pertinent in the 
first panel, concerning the role of custom in public and private inter-
national law. Public international law observes a hot debate about 
customary international law, addressed in this issue by Patrick Kelly. 
Does customary international law exist at all? If so, is it law? What 
are its sources, especially what is the role of state consent versus state 
practice? If practice, where can we find such practice – in texts and of-
ficial pronouncements, or in actual conduct of states? Is customary in-
ternational law legitimate as opposed to law formally sanctioned by 
the state? Is a return to natural law unavoidable? And what is its role 
in domestic courts? 
The private international lawyer observing this debate feels a 
certain déja vu. Private international law has viewed a very similar 
debate for decades now, relating to customary private international 
law in the form of lex mercatoria, the alleged customary law of inter-
national commerce, addressed here by Jan Dalhuisen. All the topics 
of the customary international law debate can be found in the lex 
mercatoria debate. Does lex mercatoria even exist outside the heads 
of professors who proclaim it? Is lex mercatoria actually law or merely 
custom? Are its sources in state law or in commercial practices? And 
if the latter, can we find it in texts, most notably the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts? Or must we search 
in actual commercial conduct? Is lex mercatoria legitimate, given that 
it is not established in democratic procedures? Is it some kind of natu-
ral law of commerce? And what is the role of lex mercatoria in do-
mestic courts? Can it be applied under a choice-of-law analysis? 
A second question is practical. It concerns the mutual substitut-
ability of public and private international law and institutions.  Can 
public and private international law, public and private adjudicatory 
bodies perform similar functions? And if so, which of them is prefer-
able? Can we substitute one for the other? 
Again, this is a topic for all panels. But it is addressed especially 
in the second panel that compares courts and arbitration. Investment 
disputes are an obvious example. Some investors go to domestic 
courts to bring suit against defaulting sovereigns, for example Argen-
tina. Others use arbitration to bring the same claims. Is one of them 
more appropriate than the other? Should we worry that arbitrators 
might give too little deference to state sovereignty? Or is it perhaps 
even the case that appears arbitrators give more deference to sover-
eignty than state courts? The competition is not confined to adjudica-
tory bodies; it also goes to the applicable law. If Argentina claims in-
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ability to pay because it needs the money to provide its sovereign 
functions, is this a public international law claim or a private law 
claim? A public sovereign cannot go into insolvency, but an argument 
can be made that it should retain the power to fulfill its sovereign 
functions first. A private creditor can of course become insolvent, but 
outside of this, he cannot usually rely on shortage of assets or on 
competing obligations. We may want to say that if the problems at 
stake are mostly political, they belong into international courts; if 
they are largely commercial, they should go to arbitration. But are in-
vestment disputes not intrinsically both? 
Thomas Carbonneau emphasizes the private character of arbitra-
tion and suggests this guarantees its superiority for business relations. 
Christopher Whytock by contrast focuses on the eminently public 
function of transnational governance that courts perform even where 
they adjudicate private transactions. Charles Brower, finally, demon-
strates how the character of international dispute solution shifted 
over time, from a private understanding to a much more public one. 
Quite ironically, private law was long adjudicated by public courts, 
whereas public international law usually found its way into quasi-
private arbitration. Only recently have we seen a shift – private law 
goes to private arbitration, public international law to public interna-
tional courts. Now, public and private adjudication stand in competi-
tion, especially for areas that transcend public/private law. 
A third set of questions, finally, is theoretical.  It goes back to 
what I began with: the public/private distinction on the international 
sphere. Is the distinction dead here as well? And if not, what are its 
specificities? The third and the fourth panel address these questions, 
but really they transcend all panels. 
One view would be to ignore the insights from the domestic 
question and maintain that, at least on the international sphere, pub-
lic and private are essentially different. Thus, Mark Movsesian argues 
that arbitration is essentially private and consensual and thus raises 
no great issues of legitimacy, or of enforcement; public international 
law by contrast is highly political and therefore problematic. Ernie 
Young agrees on the distinction and goes even one step further: if in-
ternational law is the highest law, he argues, its interpretation must 
largely be exercised by domestic courts. So, private law can be trans-
national; public law, including public international law, remains do-
mestic. 
Another view would directly translate the insights from the do-
mestic sphere into the international sphere. If the public/private di-
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vide is dead, then we should treat arbitral tribunals and international 
law exactly the same. Maybe we should enforce foreign public law in 
the same way in which we traditionally enforce foreign private law, 
and so on. Bill Dodge does not go this far, but he does question the 
public law taboo, the doctrine that rejects the application of foreign 
public law. Ron Brand also questions the distinction, especially in 
light of the US experience with private enforcement of public law. 
Melissa Waters, finally, discusses various ways in which the relation-
ship between domestic law and the ICJ should be conceptualized – 
some borrowed from public, some from private international law. 
A third possibility is that the public/private distinction exists, but 
in a way different from that in the domestic sphere. It is not even ex-
actly clear what the public and what the private is. Are states repre-
sentatives of common, public interests? Or are they individual actors, 
engaging in essentially private relations with other states? Is contract 
still an expansion of sovereignty? Or is sovereignty an expansion of 
contract, if the state’s competence to adjudicate and regulate is based 
on a choice of law and choice of court agreement by private parties, 
and if states, in order to receive credit, must contract out their sover-
eign rights? If this is so, the global adjudication system looks impor-
tantly different from the domestic system, and it is high time to start 
understanding it. 
What can public and private learn from each other? To what ex-
tent can we substitute public and private for each other? In what way 
are public and private distinct or similar on the transnational sphere? 
These are not easy questions, and the fact that they have rarely been 
asked so far does not make it easier to respond to them. The contri-
butions in this issue bring us closer to a response, and this is huge 
progress. 
 
